This paper discusses the metaphor of projection in relation to Hume’s treatment of causal necessity. I argue that the best understanding of projection shows it to be compatible with taking Hume to be a ‘sceptical realist’ about causal necessity, albeit an agnostic one.

Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an ‘empiricist’ critique of ‘rationalism’. This view is often illustrated – or rejected – by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical ‘rationalist’ is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, and that there is (...) some truth in the traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called ‘rationalism’. (shrink)

Christian Emden’s informative book has a number of explicit aims: the first aim is to “reconstruct Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism”; the second aim is to show “that there are specific historical reasons why Nietzsche came to adopt a position best understood in terms of philosophical naturalism”; and the third aim is to show “how Nietzsche’s naturalism and his understanding of the life sciences tie in with genealogy.”1 In pursuit of these aims, Emden divides the book into three parts, one titled “Varieties (...) of Philosophical Naturalism,” the second “Evolution and the Limits of Teleology,” and the third “Genealogy, Nature and Normativity.” In this article I shall concentrate mainly on Emden’s discussion of... (shrink)

He is the darling of naturalism or the bogeyman of scepticism, a friend to virtue or an unwitting party to incipient nihilism. He is politically conservative, or a liberator from old views. He is a fideist, an advocate of faith over reason, or a precursor of Richard Dawkins.

The original occasion for most of the chapters contained in this book was the result of a wish to establish a forum where Hume scholars of various provenances and convictions could meet and discuss all matters Humean, profiting from the very differences that commonly would make it difficult for them to cross paths with each other. This wish materialised in an interdisciplinary workshop, ‘Hume Studies in Britain’, held in Cambridge in September 2000. The title of the book is intended to (...) reflect that original interdisciplinary approach: Hume has made different impressions on the different areas of investigation here represented. Thus his writings can be taken as transparent vehicles for philosophical intuitions, problems, and arguments that are still at the centre of philosophical reflection today. On the other hand, there are readings that try to locate Hume's views against the background of concerns, debates and discussions of his own time. Hume's texts may be read as highly sophisticated literary-cum-philosophical creations: in such cases, the reader's attention tends to be directed at issues of genre and persuasive strategies rather than philosophical questions and arguments. Or they may be regarded as moments in the construction of the ideology of modernity, and as contributions to the legitimation of a given social order. As the true classics that they are, Hume's works are typical ‘open texts’, in which readers keep finding an ever new and varied bounty of inspirations. The borders between these approaches are far from neat; and this book intends to promote as much trespassing as possible between them. (shrink)